Associated with each component of the Nash equilibria of a game are its index and degree. Its index is the local degree of the displacement map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of the game. Its degree is the local degree of the projection map from the Nash graph to the space of games. We show that the index and the degree of each component are the same. Further, they are invariant to adding or deleting redundant strategies, so they depend only on the reduced normal form of the game. Applications include Kohlberg and Mertens' existence theorems for stable sets, and a simple procedure for calculating the degree of a component.
List of Symbols

Introduction
A component of the Nash equilibria of a finite game is strategically essential if every game nearby has an equilibrium nearby. Since the seminal work of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) [KM hereafter] on stability, the development of equilibrium selection criteria has focused on variations or implications of strategic essentiality. Some versions consider only subsets robust against perturbations of strategies or of the best response correspondence. Others consider components robust against payoff perturbations, motivated by the fact that all equilibria in the same component of a generic extensive-form game have the same outcome distributions, i.e., the same equilibrium paths.
However, many applications of topological methods in game theory require two possibly stronger properties. One, called nontriviality, requires that the degree of a component is nonzero. This degree is the local degree of the projection map; that is, the degree of the projection from a neighborhood in the graph of equilibria into a neighborhood of nearby games. 1 Nontriviality implies strategic essentiality, but the converse is unresolved. 2 The second, topological essentiality, requires that every function close to the game's best-reply correspondence has a fixed point nearby. O'Neill (1953) proved that the topologically essential components of the fixed points of a map are precisely those whose Lefschetz indices are nonzero. These two properties are bound to be related, since for any fixed game the index of a component is the local degree of the displacement map for which equilibria are the roots.
In this note we demonstrate a remarkable property of the graph of Nash equilibria:
the degree of a component is the same as its index. We also show that the degree and index are invariant to additions and deletions of redundant strategies; that is, they 1 Informally, the local degree counts the number of cycles around the original game traversed by the image of a cycle in the graph around the component. The degree is negative if the image has the reverse orientation, and zero if the image does not complete a cycle.
2 Mertens (1989) circumvents this difficulty by building nontriviality (with respect to strategy perturbations) into his revised definition of stability. This is the key to proving that a stable set contains a proper equilibrium, which is sequential in every extensive form with the same reduced normal form. depend only on the reduced normal form of the game. This provides a one-line proof of KM's existence theorem. It is also useful computationally since it implies that the degree is the sum of the indices of the nearby equilibria of any nearby generic game, where each index is the sign of a jacobian. Thus, to check nontriviality it suffices to sum the indices of the nearby equilibria of a single nearby game. Section 3 provides examples.
We rely on references to Dold (1972) . The formal definitions, formulated in terms of singular homology with integer coefficients, are available in a working paper; it includes a constructive proof of Theorem 1 via explicit calculation of determinants.
The Degree and Index of a Component
Fix the finite set N of players. Each player n 2 N has a finite set S n of pure strategies. The set of probability distributions over S n is n 's set 6 n of mixed strategies; 6 n is a simplex of dimension m n 0 1 , where m n j S n j . Define S 5 n2N S n and 6 5 n2N 6 n , and let m P n2N m n . A game G : S ! < N assigns to each combination of the players' pure strategies a payoff to each player. For each fixed configuration (N;S) , therefore, a game is a point in the Euclidean space < , where j Nj 2 j Sj . The Nash equilibrium correspondence ' : < ! 6 assigns to each game its set of Nash equilibria. Let ' (G) be the set of components of '(G) .
Denote by G and N the one-point compactifications (at 61 ) of the space < of games and the graph of the Nash correspondence ' . Let p : N ! G be the extension by continuity of the natural projection from the graph to games. KM's structure theorem states that there exists a homeomorphism H : N ! G such that p H 01 is homotopic to the identity map. Thus, the global degree of the projection map is +1 based on compatible orientations of the graph and the space of games. KM's homeomorphism is constructed explicitly as follows.
Represent each finite game G 2 G as the pair (G; g) , where g 2 < m and the payoff arrayG is normalized so that P tG n st = 0 , where the sum includes each profile t 2 5 6 =n S of other players' pure strategies. Then n 's payoff from the pure strategy profile (s; t) in the game The KM homeomorphism H maps the point (G; g;) 2 N , representing the game (G; g) 2 G and its equilibrium 2 6 , to another game (G; h(g;)) 2 G for which h : < m 2 6 ! < m has the formula h(g;) = g + +Ĝ() . The inverse map h 01 : z 7 ! (g;) has the two parts : < m ! < m and r : < m ! 6 , where g = (z) and = r(z). Here, (z) z 0 r(z) 0Ĝ(r(z)) , and r is the retraction to the nearest point in 6 , namely, r(z) is the unique point in 6 for which [z 0 r(z)] 1 [ 0 r(z)] 0 for every mixed strategy 2 6 ; in particular, r is the identity map on 6 .
Given a finite game G and a component C of its Nash equilibria, select any open neighborhood V N of C in the graph such that the closure of V is disjoint from each other component in ' (G) . Following Dold (IV.5), the local degree of the component, denoted Deg p (C) , is the degree of the projection p restricted to the domain V (although the degree does not depend on the choice of V ). As mentioned, the payoff arrayG can be taken as fixed; consequently, Deg p (C) is the same when the projection is restricted to p : (g;) 7 ! g , so we assume this form throughout.
The index of a component is defined for a fixed game G and a map f : 6 ! 6 whose fixed points are the equilibria of G . The index Ind f (C) of a component C 2 ' (G) is the local degree of the displacement map d r 0 f : 6 ! < m .
An immediate consequence of these definitions is the existence of components with positive degree and with positive index. Recall that the global degree of the projection map is +1 ; consequently, P C2' (G) Deg p (C) = +1 because the global degree can be computed locally over any game (Dold, IV.5.6 ). On the other hand, because the strategy space 6 is contractible, the Lefschetz number of the map f is L(f) = +1 ; consequently, the Lefschetz-Hopf Fixed Point Theorem (Dold, VII.6.6) implies that P Ind f (C) = +1 . Theorem 1 below shows that these two sums are the same term by term.
For our purposes a useful fixed-point map f is the one used by Gül, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1993) [GPS] . Fixing the game (G; g), leth() = h(g;) . Then the Nash equilibria of the game G are precisely the fixed points of the composite map f r h . This stems from the observation that is a fixed point of f if and only if each player n 's payoff vector lies in the normal cone to 6 n at n , indicating that each pure strategy is assigned positive probability by only if it is an optimal reply to other players' mixed strategies. Because the Lefschetz index has an axiomatic characterization, it seems likely that our results apply to other choices of the fixed-point map.
3 Theorem 1. The degree and index of a Nash component are the same.
Proof. Fix a game (G; g 3 ) and a component C . Let U 6 and V < m be sufficiently small neighborhoods of C andh(C) respectively. Then C is the set of fixed points of f = r h in U , andh(C) is the set of fixed points of f 3 =h r in V . By the commutativity property of the fixed-point index (Dold, VII.5.9) , the indices of C and h(C) are the same under these two maps. The first map f is the GPS map so the index under this map is Ind f (C) . On the other hand, the index under the transposed map f 3 is Deg p (C) . To see this, observe that i 0 f 3 is a displacement of the -part of h 01 ; that is, z 0 f 3 (z) = (z) 0 g 3 . Consequently,
Thus, the degree and the index of C coincide.
Theorem 2. The degree of a Nash component is invariant under addition or deletion of redundant strategies.
Proof. It is sufficient to consider only the addition of a redundant pure strategy. Also, due to the local definition of the degree, it is sufficient to consider only a component that is an isolated equilibrium of a nearby generic game. Consider the extended game G obtained from G by duplicating a pure or mixed strategy of player n , and denote by s the new pure strategy whose payoffs for all players duplicate those of . Viewing the equilibrium as a component C of the equilibria of the extended game, consider an open neighborhood U around C in < m+1 and retract U 0 Cto an m -sphere S m around C in U . We can assume that the image of S m under the displacement map d (r0f ) is a subset of B m+1 nf0g , where B m+1 is the unit ball. The index of the component is the degree of the restricted displacement map d : S m ! B m+1 nf0g . Theorem 1 asserts that this index is also the degree of the component C . Now observe that the subsets of S m and B m+1 where coordinate s is a (requisite) duplicate of the other coordinates are equatorial planes; moreover, the displacement maps one equator into the other and the two hemispheres into their counterparts. Thus the degree of the displacement map equals the degree of its restriction to the equator. But, the displacement map restricted to the equator is precisely the displacement map for the equilibrium in the original game G . This shows that the index and therefore also the degree of and C are the same in the games G and G .
Examples
For these examples we compute the index of a nearby isolated equilibrium of a nearby generic game using the jacobian specified by GPS. Each game has two components, one in which Row uses a and one in which Column uses d , and the other player uses any best-reply that sustains this behavior. Checking indices, one finds that in G the degrees of these two components are 0 and +1 , but in G 3 they are +2 and 01 . Thus, the transposition of Row's subgame payoffs from G to G 3 converts the a -component from inessential to essential, and incidentially, reverses the degree of the d -component. 
